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Additionally, there are two extended treatments incorporated in
the traditional Survey format. Under article 32, the "multiple plaintiff
anomaly" in mass tort cases is highlighted in a thought-provoking discussion and a possible solution to the problem is suggested. Under
article 62, the constitutionality of New York's attachment statute is examined in light of recent decisions in the area of due process.
Also reported herein are cases allowing relation back of a wrongful
death action which had not accrued when the original personal injury
action was commenced (CPLR 203(e)); applying the Mendel rule to
an impleader action (CPLR 213); and illustrating the willingness of the
court to protect the abused judgment debtor (CPLR 5240).
ARTIcLE

2-

LIMITATIONS OF TIME

CPLR 203(e):First Departmentallows relation back of wrongful death
action which had not accrued when personal injury action was commenced.
Pursuant to CPLR 203(e), a cause of action in an amended pleading
will be deemed to relate back to the commencement of the action if
the original pleading gave notice of the transaction, occurrences, or
series of transactions or occurrences to be proved under the amended
pleading. Several lower court decisions' have construed this provision
to permit the relation back of wrongful death claim to an original
personal injury pleading where the former was otherwise time-barred
by a statute of limitations. Under similar facts the First Department,
in Palmer v. New York City Transit Authority,2 recently assented to
this interpretation.
In Palmer an action was begun in January 1963 to recover for
injuries suffered in a subway accident in March 1962. The plaintiff
died in May 1967. His administratrix, the substituted plaintiff, moved
in January 1969 for leave to add a cause of action for wrongful death,
attributing the death in 1967 to the accident in 1962. The court allowed
the interposition of the wrongful death claim, finding that the records 3
1 Berlin v. Goldberg, 48 Misc. 2d 1073, 266 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1966), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 41 ST. JoHN's L. REv., 282, 283 (1966); Ringle v.

Bass, 46 Misc. 2d 896, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1965), discussed in The
Biannual Survey, 40 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 306, 307 (1966); contra, Roberson v. First Nat'l
City Bank, 63 Misc. 2d 105, 311 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 500, 502 (1971).

2 37 App. Div. 2d 766, 324 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1971).
3 Palmer v. New York City Transit Authority, 33 App. Div. 2d 119, 121, 305 N.Y.S.2d
831, 833 (1969). In the same court's decision on an earlier motion the records referred to
were those of the decedent as a mental patient. They established that the initial injury had
progressed to mental and emotional trauma and, inevitably, to various addictions which
were the cause of death.
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provided a sufficient causal relationship between accident and death.
In justification of its rejection of the defense that the claim was barred
by an applicable statute of limitations,4 the court noted that the information necessary to establish the plaintiff's wrongful death claim was
inaccessible during the statutory time period.5 The dissent, relying on
eminent authority,6 argued that the original pleadings did not and
could not give notice of the wrongful death claim since at the time of
the original pleadings there did not exist a cause of action for wrongful
death. By relating back the wrongful death claim to the original pleadings, it concluded, the court was in effect tolling the statute of limitations.
The express legislative intent of CPLR 203(e) was to overcome the
restrictive effect of prior case law as exemplified by Harris v. Tams.7
Through an alignment with the more liberal Rule 15(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,8 CPLR 203(e) shifted the inquiry away from
the legal theory of the claim, which was the Harrissrule, to the specified
conduct of the defendant upon which the plaintiff relied to enforce
his claim. In Berlin v. Goldberg9 the court found CPLR 203(e) to have
greater liberality than the federal rule since it only required the original
pleading to give notice of the transactions or occurrences out of which
the new cause of action in the amended complaint arose. The Berlin
court flatly concluded that there was no equitable or legal reason why
pleadings in a personal injury action did not give notice of a wrongful
death, allegedly caused by the original negligent injury, in an amended
pleading. 10
The technical construction rationale of the dissent in Palmer
4 The defendant sought summary judgment because the wrongful death cause of
action was not commenced within the time prescribed by section 1212 of the Public Authorities Law. 37 App. Div. 2d 766, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 551.

533 App. Div. 2d at 121, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 833. The records relied upon as providing a
basis for the wrongful death claim were confidential and, pursuant to sections 20 and 34
of the Mental Hygiene Law and CPLR 4504, were not made available to counsel until
subpoenaed to court for trial.
67B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 203, commentary at 123 (1972). Dean McLaughlin concluded
that to apply CPLR 203(e) "where the death occurs during the lawsuit should ... require
a clearer expression of legislative intent."
7 258 N.Y. 229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932). The Court held that amendments merely expanding or amplifying the allegations in the original pleadings related back, whereas ones
introdudng different causes of action were the equivalent of a new suit.
According to the Advisory Committee's notes, CPLR 203(e) was intended to expand the
class of amended pleadings which relate back to the original pleading and "to overcome
the effect of Harriss v. Tams .. " SECOND RP., 50-51.
8 1 WK&M 203.30. In implementing its design to overcome the restrictive effect of
Harriss v. Tams, the Advisory Committee chose the "transaction-occurrence" terminology
of rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
9 48 Misc. 2d 1073, 266 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
10 ld. at 1077, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
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underscores the overly broad reading given CPLR 203(e) in the Berlin
decision. However, where the facts of the case permit the reasonable
conclusion that notice of the wrongful death claim was given by the
original pleadings, justice is disserved by denying the assertion of such
claim upon a technical construction of the provision. It is true that the
new cause of action is supplemental in nature, since it did not exist
when the original action was commenced, but in light of the liberal
construction mandate, CPLR 203(e) should not be restrictively interpreted to exclude supplementary causes of action from the operation of
the relation back doctrine. The best approach lies in a balancing of the
equities; the resultant hardship to the plaintiff if the claim is denied
as opposed to the prejudice to the defendant if insufficient notice were
given by the original pleadings. Under these standards, Palmer dearly
achieves a just result.
CPLR 213: Mendel rule applied in impleader context.
In Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co." the Court of Appeals
held, 4 to 3, that the statute of limitations for a cause of action in breach
of warranty ran from the time of sale rather than from the time of
injury. The anomalous result- that the action was barred before the
injury was incurred- was justified as necessary "to prevent the many
unfounded suits that would be brought and sustained against manufacturers ad infinitum."' 2 While Mendel involved only one sale, it was
read as "stand[ing] for the proposition that when a defendant is sued
in warranty the period of limitations against him is measured from the
time he sold the item .... "1 3 Thus, it is not surprising that the Mendel
rationale has been extended to the impleader situation. 14
The foundation for this application was laid in C. K. S., Inc. v.
Helen Borgenicht Sportswear, Inc.,15 which clearly held that the statute
of limitations on a warranty claim commences to run at the time that
the third-party defendant sells the item to the third-party plaintiff.
This reasoning was adopted in Perez v. Chutick & Sudakoff, 16 wherein
a federal district court refused to allow amendment of a complaint by
1125 N.Y.2d 340, 252 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969). For a symposium on Mendel,
see 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 62 (1970). See also 1 NVK&M
214.14a.
12 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
13 Siegel, Procedure Catches Up-And Makes Trouble, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 63, 69
(1970).
14 See Note, An Appraisal of Judicial Reluctance to Imply an Indemnity Contract in
Time-Barred Breach of Warranty Suits, 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 361 (1965).
15 22 App. Div. 2d 650, 253 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1st Dep't 1964) (per curiam).
10 50 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court cited C.K.S., Inc. v. Helen Borgenicht Sportswear, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 650, 253 N.Y.S.2d 56 (lst Dep't 1964) and City & Country Say.
Bank v. Kramer & Sons, 43 Misc. 2d 731, 252 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964).

